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Abstract 31 
 32 
This paper questions the perspective of a “world without agriculture” which underpins the 33 
economic paradigm of “structural transformation” and “modern growth”. It does so by 34 
recomposing worldwide land and labour productivity trends in caloric terms from 1961 to 35 
2007 and by providing an heuristic model showing that the “Lewis Path” to prosperity is only 36 
one out of four possible pathways. It shows that more than half of the world population is 37 
rather embarked in a “Lewis Trap” where farmers are increasingly numerous and relatively 38 
poorer. It highlights how land scarcity and insufficient job opportunities outside agriculture 39 
prevent them to increase their labour productivity and incomes with motorized machineries. 40 
The emerging paradigm of “ecological intensification” might contribute to overcome the 41 
current deadlocks by redirecting worldwide R&D towards small-scale knowledge-intensive 42 
and context-specific agricultures overlapping the manufacture and service sectors. 43 
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 51 
1. Introduction 52 
 53 
The 2007-08 sharp increases in food prices led many agricultural economists to link the lack 54 
of interest in agriculture from both the academic and donor communities since the mid-1980s 55 
(Janvry, 2010) with the high concentration of poverty and under-nutrition in rural areas of 56 
Africa and Asia (Chen and Ravallion, 2007; FAO, 2009). They recommended to increase 57 
agricultural research and development (R&D) spending “to restore productivity growth” 58 
(Alston et al., 2009) “so that agriculture can play its role as an engine of growth and poverty 59 
reduction and act as the longer-term pillar of the twin-track approach to fighting hunger” 60 
(FAO, 2009). 61 
 62 
This role of agriculture as an engine of growth is a long standing question since the early 63 
stage of industrialization in almost all the traditions of economic thoughts, from the 64 
Physiocrats (Quesnay) to the Classical school (Ricardo). After the Second World War, it was 65 
a key dimension of the “structural transformation” paradigm (Chenery and Srinivasan, 1988), 66 
anchored in both historical experiences of “modern economic growth” (Kuznets, 1966) and 67 
dual-economy theories describing the interrelated structural changes between the “traditional” 68 
(agriculture) and “modern” (non-agriculture) sectors (Lewis, 1954). In these models, 69 
agriculture provides low-cost food, labour and savings to the process of urbanization and 70 
industrialization which, in turn, raises labour productivity in the rural economy, pulls up 71 
wages and gradually eliminates the worst dimensions of absolute poverty. Both cause and 72 
effect of economic growth, this “Lewis Path” should lead to a “world without agriculture” 73 
(Timmer, 1988, 2009): labour moves to the “modern sector” which facilitates development, 74 
economies grow, and the share of agriculture in total labour and in growth domestic product 75 
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(GDP) both decline to a level of 2-3% when converge productivity and incomes across sectors 76 
(Larson and Mundlak, 1997). 77 
 78 
After the failure of the Maoist experience, this industrialist growth pattern was not really 79 
challenged until the Club of Rome in 1972 and the “ecological critique” (MEA, 2005 and 80 
others). The later underlines the limited carrying capacity of our planet and how the 81 
modernization of agriculture since the 1960’s (Green Revolution and so on) has disturbed 82 
many ecological services (nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, biodiversity…) 83 
because of its overuse of freshwater, fossil energy and other industrial inputs. It calls for 84 
actions to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their contributions 85 
to human well-being. But it does not really address the question of how the present billion of 86 
very poor farmers concentrated in Asia and Africa can board the train without having to jump 87 
abruptly with their family members into urban slums.  88 
 89 
This paper questions the future direction of technical change in the light of past agricultural 90 
developments. A novel consolidation of existing data first shows that world food productivity 91 
routes were contrasted since the 1960’s, some of them being in sharp contrast with the “Lewis 92 
Path”. We then show why a large part of the world can hardly follow this “Lewis Path” to 93 
prosperity and may fall permanently in a “Lewis Trap” if the direction of technical change 94 
continues to favour a “world without agriculture”. Finally, we sketch a R&D agenda which 95 
aims to avoid such rural poverty trap while reconciling some important FAO and MEA’s 96 
recommendations. 97 
 98 
 99 
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 100 
2. Caloric metric and taxonomy of agricultural patterns 101 
 102 
After pioneering works such as those of Schultz (1953), Solow (1957) or Farell (1957) on 103 
productivity and its measurement, comparative research on the rate and direction of 104 
productivity growth in agriculture has gone through three stages according to Ruttan (2002). 105 
(1) The measurement of partial productivity ratios such as output per worker and per hectare 106 
helped to identify wide differences among countries or world regions. 107 
(2) With cross-country production functions and multifactor productivity estimates, Hayami 108 
and Ruttan showed that resource endowments (land and livestock), modern technical inputs 109 
(machinery and fertilizer) and human capital (including technical education) each accounted 110 
for around one-fourth of the differences in labour productivity between developed and less-111 
developed countries. Since the economies of scale represented only 15 percent of the 112 
differences, they concluded that population pressure on land resources could be circumvented 113 
and the labour productivity increased by several multiples (up to the levels of Western Europe 114 
in the early 1960s) by investing in agricultural research, human capital and modern 115 
agricultural inputs. 116 
(3) Studies testing the convergence of growth rates and levels of multifactor productivity 117 
mostly employ the Malmquist or frontier productivity approach. They generally indicate a 118 
widening productivity gap between developed and developing countries from the early 1960s 119 
to the early 1990s, and declining total factor productivity in developing countries (relative to 120 
the frontier countries) with less technical change against efficiency change.  121 
 122 
In this paper, we come back to the early stage of this research line, building upon new 123 
estimates of production for representing land and labour productivities. We aggregate in 124 
 6 
kilocalories (kcal) all plant food harvested during a year (one crop or more), in almost all 125 
countries of the world and during a 47-year period (1961-2007). These new partial 126 
productivity estimates enlarge some published by Hayami et Ruttan (1985), Malassis et 127 
Padilla (1986) or Bairoch (1999). They cover a time period characterized by unprecedented 128 
productivity changes in agriculture.  129 
 130 
Our graphical technique to summarize global trends in land and labour productivities differ 131 
from the one adopted by Hayami, Ruttan or Craig et al. (1997), but retain the same five 132 
dimensions: acreage of land per agricultural worker (here, x-axis), partial land productivity 133 
(y-axis), partial labour productivity (iso-curves), time (1961-2007) and space (countries or 134 
regions). Figure 1 shows two orthogonal directions between which labour productivity can be 135 
increased in agriculture: higher production per piece of land (with irrigation, fertilizers, etc.) 136 
and higher cultivated land per worker (with tractors, combine harvesters, etc.). These 137 
directions are subsequently called “intensification” and “motorization”. 138 
 139 
The representation above is based on a simple identity that we label “TALA” for 140 
“Technology, Affluence and Labour productivity in Agriculture”, where Q denotes the 141 
production of plant food (kcal), A the acreage of cultivated land (ha) and La the workforce in 142 
agriculture (heads): 143 
 144 
Q/A  A/La = Q/La (1) TALA 
 145 
In TALA, the increase in labour productivity (Q/La, in kcal/worker) is the product of the 146 
increase in “intensification” (higher Q/A, in kcal/ha) by the increase in “motorization” (higher 147 
A/La, in ha/worker). 148 
 149 
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If we insert the two left-side components of the TALA equation into a broader OTAWA 150 
identity (“Outcome, Technology, Affluence and Workforce in Agriculture”), we show how 151 
they co-evolve with the share of agricultural labour into total population (La/N) to contribute 152 
to the total per capita production (Q/N): 153 
 154 
Q/N = Q/A  A/La  La/N (2) OTAWA 
 155 
This identity describes the ex-post result of the interaction between parameters but is not a 156 
causal relationship treating the right-side parameters as independent variables. Utilized by 157 
Malassis and Padilla (1986), it allows for characterizing generic patterns of agricultural 158 
production in relation to socioeconomic conditions1. More specifically, it helps checking 159 
whether changes in agricultural per capita production and yields follow an “intensification” 160 
pathway all over the world, or whether there are significant differences in the two other terms. 161 
These terms are critical for characterizing the “growth engine” at play. They relate the 162 
affluence of land per worker and the “motorization” of agriculture to a central dynamic of the 163 
“Lewis Path” of “structural transformation”, i.e. the “discharging” (Sauvy, 1980) of labour 164 
from agriculture (La) to other sectors and the convergence of productivity and incomes across 165 
sectors. 166 
 167 
To further explore this dynamic between sectors, it is necessary to come back to the 168 
conventional metric of labour productivity, namely the value-added in monetary terms (Y). 169 
The data are fully available from 1970 in constant 1990-US$ for the agricultural and non-170 
agricultural sectors (Y=Ya+Yna). They are used to calculate the two following indicators: 171 
 172 
                                                          
1
 OTAWA identity is similar to the “IPAT identity” used in the environmental literature (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1972; 
Waggoner and Ausubel, 2002), where I (environmental impacts) = N (population size)  A (level of affluence)  T (level of 
technology), and the “Kaya identity” in the energy literature (from the name of the Japanese engineer Yoichi Kaya). 
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(i) the difference between the share of agriculture in total incomes and the share of farmers in 173 
total labour; because C.P. Timmer amply uses this difference, we name it by analogy the 174 
“Timer gap” (TG): 175 
(Ya/Y) – (La/L) (3) Timer Gap (TG) 
 176 
(ii) the ratio of the above two shares that we name the “Timer ratio” (TR): 177 
(Ya/Y) / (La/L) (4) Timer Ratio (TR) 
 178 
With “modern growth”, TG is initially negative (the average income per worker in agriculture 179 
is below the national average) and is expected to narrow towards 0 with higher per-capita 180 
incomes, while TR is initially low (near 0) and increases towards 1 when TG gets closer to 0.  181 
 182 
We can make a heuristic use of TR equation to characterize the conditions of structural 183 
transformation towards a “world without agriculture” (the “Lewis Path”), and what other 184 
pathways are followed when these conditions are not met. We do so by crossbreeding two 185 
derivatives with respect to time.  186 
 187 
(iii) The derivative of TR (Equation 6), with θ = Y/L and θa = Ya/La, shows that TR growth rate 188 
is positive and converges towards 1 only when the agricultural labour productivity θa grows 189 
faster than the average labour productivity θ. 190 
 191 
ln(TR) = ln(Ya) – ln(Y) – ln(La) + ln(L) = ln(θa) – ln(θ) (5) 
θθθθ /// &&& −= aaTRRT  (6) 
 192 
(iv) The derivative of θa (Equation 8) shows that the number of agricultural workers decreases 193 
only when the agricultural labour productivity θa grows faster than the agricultural product Ya. 194 
 9 
 195 
ln(θa) = ln(Ya/La)  ln(La) = ln(Ya) – ln(θa) (7) 
aaaaaa YYLL θθ /// &&& −=  (8) 
 196 
These results are interesting not to only confirm intuition. They show out that according to the 197 
sign of TR and La growth rates, three other pathways than the “Lewis Path” can be identified 198 
and characterized according to the relative growths of Ya, θa and θ (Table 1). 199 
 200 
(a) In pathway A, the “Lewis Path” leading to a “world without agriculture”, agricultural 201 
workforce decreases (negative La growth rate) and farm and nonfarm labour incomes 202 
converge (TR tends towards 1) because agricultural labour productivity (θa), boosted by 203 
motorized equipments in the current technological pattern, grows faster than the demand for 204 
agricultural products (Ya) and the labour productivity in non-agricultural sectors (θna). 205 
 206 
(b) In pathway B, the number of farmers decreases as in A, but the income gap with other 207 
workers increases (negative TR growth rate). This is a “Farmer-Excluding” growth since 208 
farmers become fewer and poorer. Like in the Soviet Union during the anti-Koulak campaigns 209 
in the 1930s, economic revenues per farmer (θa) grow slower than the average, and the 210 
agricultural surplus is transferred to other sectors at risk of famines in a predominantly rural 211 
economy. 212 
 213 
(c) Pathway C is “Farmer-Inclusive” since their number increases and their incomes converge 214 
to the nonfarm ones. One can imagine here an agricultural product (Ya) that grows rapidly due 215 
to growing domestic demand or agricultural exports, which pulls farmers wealth up (θa) 216 
relative to the rest of the active population whose own income growth is rather low (θna), 217 
possibly nil or even negative (growing urban poverty). 218 
 219 
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(d) In pathway D, both agricultural workforce and its income gap with other sectors increase. 220 
It is the extreme opposite of the Lewis Path and we name it “Lewis Trap” because unless new 221 
lands are available for cultivation, the average acreage per farmer decreases (more and more 222 
farmers on the same piece of land) along with the opportunity to boost their individual 223 
productivity with motorization. Farmers are more numerous and poorer since they can’t 224 
increase their productivity (θa) faster than the food demand (Ya)2 and the labour productivity 225 
gains in non-agricultural sectors (θna).  226 
 227 
Let us now examine which of these pathways have been followed in the past and which part 228 
of the humanity is actually in a “Lewis Path”. 229 
 230 
 231 
3. Empirical evidences: Lewis Path versus Lewis Trap 232 
 233 
 3.1. Productivity estimates with a calorie metric 234 
 235 
Obtaining comparable measures of real agricultural output for a wide range of countries and 236 
time periods requires considerable care. Most studies built indexes based on a basket of 237 
agricultural products whose production in monetary value is deflated by general price 238 
inflation in order to capture real production changes over time (Craig et al., 1997). This 239 
technique is a way of getting time series of “real agricultural output” but faces well-known 240 
difficulties, such as structural changes over time in the composition of the output basket, 241 
absence of detailed data on local prices, PPP versus real exchange rates dilemma. 242 
 243 
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 which include their own demand for food 
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In order to trace in physical terms national overall agricultural productions and partial 244 
productivities of land and labour, we aggregated national tonnages of crop outputs through a 245 
common metric, the calorie, in a similar way the ton oil equivalent (toe) is used to build 246 
energy balances. We did that in three steps. 247 
 248 
(a) Checking and merging of five international statistical series: “Commodity Balances”3, 249 
“Land”4, “Population”5 and “Machinery”6 from FAO (2010) over 47 years (1961-2007) and, 250 
for our cross-sector study, “Value Added by economic activity”7 from UNSTAT (2010) over 251 
38 years (1970-2007) – Many islands or micro-states had to be removed because of missing 252 
or inconsistent data, and, for the same reason, Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman, Papua New Guinea 253 
and Somalia. Our final database, however, covers 98% of the world population (2000) and of 254 
the world land area (Antarctica excluded). 255 
 256 
(b) Conversion and aggregation into calories of all harvested edible plant biomass – Our 257 
aggregated index of plant food productions in calories writes Qr = ∑i (qirci), where r is a 258 
country or region, i a plant biomass edible in its primary form (cereal, oilseed, root, fruit, etc., 259 
regardless its final use as food, feed, seed or other)8, q its volume of production in metric 260 
tonnes, and c its food caloric content (kcal per tonne) according to the FAO (2001) or the 261 
USDA (2006)9. The regions considered in this study are six or eight: Sub-Saharan Africa 262 
(SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 263 
                                                          
3
 of which agricultural production in tonnes 
4
 of which “Arable land” (annual crops) and “Permanent crops” (perennial crops); we named “cultivated area” the sum of the 
two land surfaces 
5
 of which “total population”, “urban population”, “agricultural population”, “total economically active population” and 
“total economically active population in agriculture” 
6
 of which “agricultural tractors in use” 
7
 of which “Total value added” and “Value added from agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing” at constant 1990 prices in US 
dollars (USD) 
8
 55 product lines of the FAO’s Commodity Balances: Wheat, rice & other grains of cereals; Beans, peas & other pulses; 
Cassava, potatoes & other roots or tubers; Tomatoes, onions & other vegetables; Apple, oranges & other fruit; Soya bean, 
cottonseeds, olives & other oilseeds or tree nuts; Sugars & molasses; Cocoa, coffee & tea; Pepper, cloves & other spices 
9
 for details on calculations and general checking of the estimates, see Dorin (2011) 
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developing Asia (ASIA) of South Asia (sASIA) and East Asia (eASIA), Transition Countries 264 
(TRAN) and, finally, industrialized countries of 1990-OECD10 (OECD) in Eurasia (eOECD) 265 
and in north America and Oceania (aOECD) (Figure 2).  266 
 267 
(c) Estimation of partial land and labour productivities – Regional productions Qr were 268 
divided by, respectively, corresponding FAO’s net areas under annual and permanent crops 269 
(A), and FAO’s “economically active populations in agriculture” (La). Since the FAO uses 270 
new ILO11 estimates that starts from 1980 only (5th edition, revision 2008), we inferred 1961-271 
1979 active populations from the updated 1980 values and the 1961-1980 annual growth rates 272 
calculated with earlier estimates12. These labour statistics include male and female workers 273 
involved in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and therefore do not only count people 274 
producing plant food. Similarly, cultivated lands include some other agricultural production 275 
than edible biomass, such as fibres, rubber, tobacco or fodders. These biases tend to 276 
underestimate land and labour productivities, especially in countries producing relatively 277 
more non-food biomass or more animal products than the average13. 278 
 279 
 3.2. A striking heterogeneity of productivity pathways 280 
 281 
Our results can be synthesised in a five-dimension graph which shows the specific path 282 
(1961-2007) of each region according to the average land availability per farmer (x-axis) and 283 
the ability to increase land (y-axis) and labour (isocurves) productivities.  284 
 285 
                                                          
10
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as in 1990 
11
 International Labour Organisation, Geneva 
12
 “Population-Estimates 2004 rev.” as released by the FAO in 2008. With these previous estimates, our world active 
population in agriculture reached 1,058,355 thousands people in 1980 (841,.922 in 1961 and 1,308,611 in 2000) while it 
reaches only 948,580 with the latest estimates (760,656 in 1961 and 1,217,540 in 2000). 
13
 It is tricky to include animal products in the calculations (about 10% of the total world production of food calories) since 
their production rely on (i) domestic plant foods (already taken into account in our calculations) and imported ones (such as 
oilcakes), (ii) large but very poorly known surfaces of permanent grazing areas (pastures, savannah, shrubs, etc.) 
 13 
Figure 3a shows two striking points:  286 
(i) a fantastic growth of labour productivity in industrialized countries due to motorization and 287 
concomitant opportunities for many workers to migrate outside the farm sector;  288 
(ii) despite such growth, a world average food productivity path that remains rather close to 289 
that of Asia, based above all on a yield boost with extremely low labour productivity and a 290 
declining availability of land per farmer.  291 
 292 
Figure 3b shows the same results with a log-scale for x-axis and the partition of two regions 293 
(OECD and ASIA) into two subsets, while Figure 3c projects all countries without grouping 294 
them into regions. These last two figures show two other striking points:  295 
(iii) the very special position of USA, Canada and Australia compared with that of other 296 
countries;  297 
(iv) a critical interval, between 2 and 3 ha per farmer, below which the affluence of land 298 
usually decreases and above which it usually raises. 299 
 300 
The following section details these results to show how the global increase in food production 301 
is based on contrasting regional dynamics. 302 
 303 
 3.3. Contrasting regional development paths 304 
 305 
(a) Global performances 306 
In 47 years, the world14 production of food calories of plant origin increased by 186%, from 307 
less than 12 Tera kcal a day in 1961 to over 33 in 2007 (Figure 4a). As the human population 308 
has slightly more than doubled during the same period (+116%), the world average daily 309 
                                                          
14
 In this paper, “world” means the total of our Agribiom countries (Figure 2). 
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availability of plant food per capita was enhanced by 1240 kcal in five decades to reach 5,070 310 
in 2007, but with large regional differences (Figure 4b). This growth was achieved through:  311 
- 153 millions additional hectares of cultivated area (+11%) (Figure 5a) and a 156% increase 312 
in their daily productivity (from 8,620 kcal/ha in 1961 to 22,110 in 2007)15, 313 
- 514 millions additional agricultural workers (+68%) (Figure 6a) and a 70% increase in their 314 
daily productivity (from 15,320 to 26,095 kcal/worker). 315 
As a combined effect of these evolutions, the world average number of persons nourished by 316 
a farmer has increased from 4.0 to 5.2 (+29%) despite a puzzling decrease in the average 317 
cultivated area per agricultural worker, from 1.8 to 1.2 ha.  318 
 319 
(b) Highest land productivity in Asia 320 
Figure 5b displays the regional plant food productions per cultivated hectare. It shows 321 
continuous growths (except for transition countries) but growing discrepancy between 322 
regions, from one to two in the early 1960s (5,100 to 10,400 kcal a day) to one to three in 323 
2007 (10,300 to 31,400 kcal a day). Since the mid-1980s onwards, land productivity in food 324 
calories has become the highest in Asia16 where investments in infrastructure, education, 325 
credit, irrigation, fertilizers, high-yielding varieties and price-regulations helped to boost both 326 
crop intensity (number of crops per year on the same plot) and individual crop yields (mainly 327 
those of wheat, rice, sugarcane and oil palm). For industrialized countries, many reasons can 328 
explain their apparent yield deceleration since the mid-1980s: lower incentives for caloric 329 
foodstuffs, increasing prices of fossil energies and other agricultural inputs such as fertilizers 330 
and water, soil or biodiversity erosion, environmental regulations, etc. By contrast, land 331 
productivity is accelerating in Latin America where sugarcane and oilseeds crops have 332 
                                                          
15
 This leads us to estimate that 90% of the world plant food production growth was based on an increase in land productivity 
and not land extension, with of course regional specificities (just about 65% in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America for 
example): see Table 3 ([5]/[3]). 
16
 Above 40,000 kcal/ha in 2007 in Malaysia (62,200), China (46,100), Bangladesh (42,500) and Vietnam (41,500), but also 
in European countries such as Belgium (56,800), Germany (44,600), the Netherlands (41,400) and the United Kingdom 
(40,100). 
 15 
increased dramatically for food and non-food uses (feed and biofuels), closing the gap with 333 
industrialized countries during the 2000s. The land productivity in MENA has been 334 
multiplied by three which is the highest growth rate after Asia, whereas it was by two only in 335 
Sub-Saharan Africa where the Green Revolution has been less supported than elsewhere.  336 
 337 
(c) A labour productivity boom in industrialized countries 338 
In contrast with the land productivity indicator, the production of food calories per worker 339 
increased far more quickly in industrialized countries than in non-industrialized ones. In 2007, 340 
it reached a daily average of almost 670,000 kcal (1,992,000 in Canada, 1,908,000 in USA, 341 
1,118,000 in France, 1,107,000 in Denmark) whereas it remained below 120,000 kcal in all 342 
other regions, and even below 14,000 in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 6b). This 343 
“agricultural divide” is due to motorized machineries (see the “number of tractors” per 344 
agricultural worker in Figure 6c) and higher consumption of fossil fuel (Giampietro et al., 345 
2011). These results go along with huge differences in incomes17: almost 120 US$ a day in 346 
2007 for an industrialized farmer whereas it is below 2 $ in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 347 
(3.9 US$ on world average). In the latter two regions, the labour productivity is about the 348 
same in 2007 despite large differences in land productivities. The average availability in land 349 
per worker explains this apparent paradox (it is 2.6 times lower in Asia than in Saharan 350 
Africa) even if it decreased in both regions during the period.  351 
 352 
(d) Opposite trends in land per farmer 353 
The average net-cultivated areas per agricultural worker (x-axis of Figure 3a) shows a striking 354 
divergence between two groups of regions: 355 
                                                          
17
 Average agricultural value-added per farmer in constant 1990-US$. This income has to pay for human work but also fixed 
assets if any (land, draft animals, buildings, equipments…). 
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- a constant rise in industrialized countries, transition countries and Latin America, up to 356 
respectively 26.6 ha, 9.9 ha and 4.0 ha in 200718; 357 
- a decrease everywhere else, down to 2.5 ha in MENA, 1.15 ha in Sub-Saharan Africa and 358 
0.45 ha in Asia. 359 
By definition, these evolutions combine evolutions of net-cultivated land (Figure 5a) and of 360 
active population (Figure 6a). The cultivated land has decreased in transition and 361 
industrialized countries (–64 Mha in total over 47 years) but expanded in other regions (+217 362 
Mha), especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 3) at the expense of two 363 
carbon and biodiversity pools, forests or permanent pastures19. The agricultural active 364 
population has also decreased in transition and industrialized countries (–64 Mcap.) and 365 
expanded elsewhere (+594 Mcap.) except in Latin America since 2000. It has even doubled or 366 
more in Asia (+91%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (+150%). The latter two regions now gather 367 
91% of the world farmers (77% in 1961) who represent 60% of the regional workforce (80% 368 
in 1961). This share is much lower elsewhere (Figure 6d). 369 
 370 
 3.4. Growing divergences: a silent bifurcation 371 
 372 
Some decades ago, Hayami and Ruttan delimited three “growth paths” (Ruttan, 2002: 10-11): 373 
(i) in the “land-abundant path” where stand industrialized and transition countries according 374 
to our growth estimates (Table 3), output per worker (column [8]) rises more rapidly than 375 
output per hectare (column [5]); 376 
                                                          
18
 This average cultivated area per worker do not account for disparities within a region or a country, which can be large. 
E.g.: according to USDA, there are 2.2 millions farms in the USA in 2010; their average size is 169 ha, but 56% of them have 
an average size of 34 ha and cultivate only 11% of the land whereas 10% of them have an average size close to 800 ha and 
crop nearly half of the cultivated land. Similarly, in many Latin-American coexist a formal sector with few large-scale 
capital-intensive enterprises adopting labour-saving technologies, and an informal sector with numerous small-scale, labour-
intensive enterprises based on low wages. 
19
 Between 1961 and 2007, the world area under pasture increased by 278 Mha (+9%), with +135 Mha in ASIA (+32%), +77 
Mha in MENA (+32%) and +85 Mha in LAC (+19%). 
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(ii) in the “intermediate growth path” where are Latin America and MENA, output per worker 377 
and per hectare grows at a somewhat comparable rates; 378 
(iii) in the “land-constrained path” where fall Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, output per hectare 379 
rises faster than output per worker. 380 
 381 
It is indeed the abundance of land that first explains the labour productivity growth in 382 
agriculture. In the first group however (“land-abundant path”), high and growing affluence of 383 
land per farmer (A/La) is not explained by an extension of the cultivated land (A) much faster 384 
than elsewhere (columns [1]) but rather by a massive decrease in the number of farmers 385 
(column [7]). This emigration began much before our study period but was sustained by the 386 
development of heavy motorized equipments in the second half of the twentieth century. Such 387 
“labour-saving” and “energy-intensive” path did not occur elsewhere – or with delay and at a 388 
much slower pace – which enlarged gaps similar to the ones that Pomeranz (2000) has traced 389 
back to 1750. 390 
 391 
Rural exodus and motorization increase the abundance of land per farmer, their labour 392 
productivity and the convergence of their incomes toward those of other workers. It is the 393 
“structural transformation”. Figure 7a and Figure 7b clearly show the equal importance in this 394 
transformation of the GDP growth per capita and of the land growth per farmer. The 395 
indicators of a "world without agriculture" (y-axis) follow indeed very similar trends, be they 396 
plotted against the national average GDP per capita (x-axis) like in C.P. Timmer (2009: 7) or 397 
against the national average acreage per farmer. 398 
 399 
Before 1970, the land affluence per farmer was below 5 ha in industrialized Eurasia, transition 400 
countries and Latin America. It was much lower than in North America and Oceania but 401 
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within or above the critical interval of 2-3 ha mentioned before, and their TG value (Equation 402 
3) rose well above –10% in 2007 (Figure 7c). The MENA region followed them with the most 403 
spectacular change of TG value observed between 1970 and 2007, from –43% to –15%, while 404 
its land affluence stayed within the critical interval throughout the period. However, MENA 405 
also became meantime a massive importer of food thanks partly to its export of oil, whereas 406 
OECD and Latin American countries became growing net food exporters (Dorin, 2011: 64). 407 
 408 
On the other hand, all regions having an affluence of land below 2 ha per farmer remained 409 
stuck below a TG value of –35% in 2007, a value which is also the 2007 average of the whole 410 
world due to the demographic importance of these regions (Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa). 411 
The Asian one even shows a declining TG value, i.e. a growing income gap between 412 
agricultural workers and the others. Do these regions – in particular – have a chance to follow 413 
the road to prosperity marked out by Lewis in theory, by industrialized countries in practice? 414 
In these industrialized countries, the agricultural share in total employment is now below 3% 415 
(13% in 1970) while their GDP per capita is at least 7 times higher than elsewhere (less than 6 416 
in 1970). 417 
 418 
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 419 
4. Changing utopia for another? 420 
 421 
Table 4 sumps up above results and characterizes agricultural transformation pathways 422 
followed by the main world regions over 1970-200720. It shows that the Lewis’s road of 423 
“structural transformation” was followed only by industrialized and transition countries21. 424 
Latin America and Africa followed a “Farmer-Inclusive” path with an increasing number of 425 
farmers and a narrowing gap between farm and non-farm incomes, while Asia (more than half 426 
of the world population) is embarked in a “Lewis Trap”. The question though is under what 427 
conditions Africa and Latin America can avoid falling in this trap and Asia go out from it. 428 
 429 
Long-term scenarios apt to respond this question should integrate various conjectures about 430 
the future of the economic globalisation process, the links between ageing and saving 431 
behaviours, productivity trends in farm and non-farm sectors, dynamics of markets like 432 
energy, land and real estates, etc. They are not currently available.  433 
 434 
In their absence however, it is possible to use the “simple mathematics” of Timmer (2009: 10) 435 
to show out the fundamental parameters at play in shifting from a “Lewis Trap” to a “Lewis 436 
Path”. The labour productivity growth in the non-agricultural sector is one of them. If it 437 
remains constant (for example), labour can move from agriculture to non-agriculture as fast as 438 
the non-agricultural sector grows. This is the “fast track” of the “Lewis Path”. Conversely, if 439 
                                                          
20
 Note that similar growth rates of labour productivity in agriculture are obtained despite the change of metric, from per-
worker production of plant calories (Table 3, column 8) to per-worker value-added in 1990-US$ (Table 4, column 7). One 
exception is East Asia where high value-added productions such as meat grew faster than the plant food productions. Results 
of Table 3 over 1970-2007: 3.90% (aOECD, vs. 3.69% in 1990-US$), 4.77% (eOECD, vs. 4.36%), 2.61% (TRAN, vs. 
3.07%), 2.98% (LAC, vs. 2.73%), 2.11% (MENA, vs. 2.40%), 0.51% (SSA, vs. 1.01%), 1.13% (sASIA, vs. 1.25%), 1.55% 
(eASIA, vs. 3.00%).  
21
 15 countries in 2007 out of 154 in our sample have less then 3% of their workforce employed in agriculture: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden, The Netherlands, 
United kingdom, USA. Except for Kuwait, UK and USA, all of them had a percentage above 6% in 1980. In 2007, a “world 
without agriculture” (3% share of total employment) would mean 93 millions farmers producing each 358000 kcal/day on 
16 ha (39, 302000 and 35 respectively in 1961). 
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the non-agricultural labour productivity grows at the same rate than the sector itself, the latter 440 
cannot absorb any new workers and the rural labour is forced to remain in agriculture or to be 441 
jobless. 442 
 443 
With Timmer’s arithmetic, let us conduct a simple heuristic exercise projecting India in 2050 444 
thought a baseline scenario and two variants of non-agricultural labour productivity growth. 445 
These scenarios share common assumptions on population growth, land surfaces and GDP 446 
growth (Table 5). Population assumptions (total and active) are derived from FAO (2010) and 447 
capture the expected “demographic dividend”22. Assumptions on GDP are those of Shukla 448 
and Dhar (2011)’s baseline scenario for India (2005-2050) relying on a computable general 449 
equilibrium: an average growth of 7.3%23 per annum (p.a.) with 2.6% from agriculture and 450 
7.7% for all other sectors.  451 
 452 
The overall growth gives an average GDP growth per worker of 6.2% p.a. leading to 67 US$ 453 
per day in 2050. By sector, it is 3.0% for farm activities and 5.4% for non-farm activities in 454 
Shukla and Dhar’s baseline scenario24. When the overall growth of labour productivity (ln θ = 455 
6.2%) is higher than the agricultural one (ln θa = 3.0%) and when the latter is higher than the 456 
growth of the agricultural outputs (ln Ya = 2.6%), it indicates a “Farmer-Excluding” path 457 
according to our typology (Table 1). Farmers are fewer (their share in the workforce fall to 458 
30%) but relatively poorer; they earn on average 17 times less than non-agricultural workers 459 
(TR = 0.1) whereas it was a little more than 6 in 2007 (TR = 0.29) (Table 5). 460 
 461 
                                                          
22
 Rise in the rate of per capita economic growth due to a rising share of working age people in a population. 
23
 assumption lying between the 2000-2007 growth rate (5.6%) and very optimistic projections (e.g. 8.5% over 2007-2050 
from Hawksworth and Cookson, 2008) 
24
 The average growth (6.2%) is higher than 5.4% and 3.0% because each worker passing from agriculture to non-agriculture 
yields an incremental 2.4% productivity growth rate. 
 21 
From this baseline, we test the sensibility of above results to two different assumptions 462 
regarding the labour productivity growth rate in non-agricultural activities (scenarios 1 and 2), 463 
all things being equal. In scenario 1, the rate passes from 5.4% to 5.8% p.a. Table 5 shows 464 
that India then falls in a “Lewis Trap” (ln θa < ln Ya). Compared to 2007, farmers are 465 
relatively poorer (TR = 0.1) but also more numerous (still 40% of the workfoce in 2050). 466 
Because of higher labour productivity growth in the non-agricultural sector, the labour 467 
demand of this sector is lower at constant output and cannot absorb as much agricultural 468 
population as in the baseline scenario. 575 million people (farmers with their family 469 
members) lives alongside much richer urban dwellers (about 1 billion people) and the average 470 
available land falls to 0.58 ha per agricultural worker (0.66 in 2007). Such a disparity would 471 
put the growth catch-up in India at risk of being disrupted by severe social and political crises, 472 
a typical danger for high-performing Asian economies pinpointed by Hayami and Godo 473 
(2004). 474 
 475 
In scenario 2, we calculate the average labour productivity growth of non-farm workers 476 
needed to reach “an India without agriculture” in 2050 after a fast Lewis Path. This rate, 4.6% 477 
p.a., is much lower than in the baseline (5.4%). A likely unrealistic labour productivity 478 
growth rate of 9.3% in agriculture has thus to be assumed to achieve the convergence of 479 
incomes (TR = 1) to 67 US$ per worker and 30 US$ per capita after four decades of 480 
unprecedented rural drift. 481 
 482 
The limitation of these numerical experiments is that a higher (lower) labour productivity 483 
could lead to a higher (lower) GDP and a higher (lower) absorbing capacity25. But this 484 
                                                          
25
 In the absence of model endogenizing in a credible way labour productivities in India, final and external demand and the 
competitiveness of Indian production in 2050, one can simply note that a higher GDP is unlikely because our baseline 
scenario is perhaps already too optimistic. An average annual growth rate of 7.3% over nearly a half-century would already 
be very exceptional for a large country and would likely confront constraints in the pace of construction of the underlying 
infrastructures. Over 1970-2007 (37 years), we found only China above such a rate, with 8.5% (rate measured with total 
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limitation is unessential to show out that, in India as elsewhere, the future of agriculture is not 485 
determined by the only specific parameters of the sector. Hence, the Lewis Path depends on a 486 
“fine tuning” between the growth rate of outputs and the labour productivities in the farm and 487 
non-farm sectors. The uncertainty surrounding such a “fine tuning” seems much higher than 488 
in the past, even in the long run, for reasons discussed below.  489 
 490 
The Lewis’ structural transformation is likely to span generations but Timmer (2009) first 491 
shows that over the past 50 years, the turning point where the divergence turns to convergence 492 
has been reached at later and later stages in the economic transformation of successful growth 493 
performers, “perhaps suggesting that industry is becoming less and less able to absorb labour” 494 
(Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010). There are two reasons to think that such a trend will 495 
continue in the future. Firstly, although gains in industrial labour productivity through 496 
economies of scale and motorization/automation almost saturate in OECD countries, they will 497 
develop elsewhere. Secondly, this trend might co-exist with a slower increase of industrial 498 
production due to increasing cost of oil and other non-renewable raw materials, strengthening 499 
of environment-friendly regulations, market saturation in industrialized countries, slower 500 
increase of wages in developed economies not fully compensated by an increase of incomes 501 
in developing countries. The overall result might be the co-existence in urban areas of highly 502 
skilled and highly paid labour with high labour intensive and low wages services, but this 503 
amounts to transfer to cities the social fragmentation problem26.  504 
 505 
The increasing difficulties to follow a Lewis Path are confirmed by the end point of scenario 506 
2. More than 80% of the population (1.3 billion people out of 1.6) lives in cities whose 507 
density reaches 55,000 inhabitants per km2 (Table 5) while in 2010, it was 35,000 in Dhaka 508 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
value-added in 1990-US$ from Unstat, 2010). It was followed by countries only in Asia: Malaysia (7.1%), South Korea 
(6.5%), Thailand (6.2%), Vietnam (6.1%) and Indonesia (6.0%).  
26
 The “Farmer-Inclusive” growth of Latin America and Africa? 
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(Bangladesh) and 27,100 in Mumbai (India), the two current densest cities in the world 509 
(Demographia, 2011). Such a mega-urbanization is a challenge ever faced in history. In 510 
Europe, the Lewis Path was instead facilitated by the emigration of 60 million people to the 511 
“New Worlds” (35 million to the USA alone) between 1850 and 1930 (Losch et al., 2011). 512 
Such large open spaces for exporting labour surpluses do not exist anymore. 513 
 514 
The end point of scenario 2 also shows that in rural areas, the available land per farmer is 515 
bounded to 10 ha. The figure is much lower with a lower mega-urbanization. There is thus no 516 
perspective of boosting farm labour productivity through large-scale motorization as in OECD 517 
countries where the average land acreage per farmer was 27 ha in 2007. Indian farmers may 518 
try to overcome this barrier by increasing the land productivity with more external inputs 519 
(fertilizers, pesticides, fuels, seeds, water) but the marginal productivity of these inputs 520 
decreases and the negative externalities of their intensive use are already high (natural 521 
resource depletion, biodiversity loss, global greenhouse gases, animal and human health 522 
problems) (Dorin and Landy, 2009). They may increase the efficiency of their use but their 523 
ever-increasing price may wipe off all efforts. They may get better prices for their products on 524 
international markets but they can hardly compete with the large-scale and well-organized 525 
agro-industries that emerged during the past century. Since they cannot migrate enough to 526 
already crowded urban shantytowns, they may actually stay with a business whose natural 527 
capital declines (soil, biodiversity, safe water) while their own capabilities are diminished due 528 
to poverty (nutrition, health, education). This is the Lewis trap.  529 
 530 
The contradictions to which a Lewis Path leads are not specific to the Indian example but the 531 
latter helps to highlight them. Bifurcating towards an alternative pathway requires an overall 532 
redirection of R&D where genetically modified organisms (GMO) are far to be the master 533 
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piece as many believe it. GMO may help to save some inputs like nitrogen, water or pesticide 534 
but they increase the cost of seed and will not solve the labour absorption problem we have 535 
just demonstrated the critical importance.  536 
 537 
The problem is to increase total agricultural production (Q) and farmers’ wealth (θa) without 538 
downsizing in large proportion their number (La) and without jeopardizing natural resources. 539 
It can be written as follows, where anaY  is the cost of non-agricultural inputs (chemical 540 
fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, etc.) and p the price paid to farmers for their production: 541 
a
a
naa LYpQ /)( −=θ  (9) 
 542 
Over the past decades, R&D focused on few monocultures whose production Q increased 543 
with higher anaY  and environmental costs (Foley et al., 2005) while their price p decreased, 544 
making the equation really profitable (θa) only when farmers were fewer (La) with larger 545 
acreages. Revising and enlarging such a selective R&D requires finding an alternative to 546 
input-dependent and ecologically simplified food production systems to increase Q.  547 
 548 
This alternative resembles the agenda of the “agro-ecological perspective” (Altieri, 1999) or 549 
“agro-ecological matrix” (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2010) that can also be called “ecological 550 
intensification”: 551 
(1) diverse agro-ecological systems exploiting best biological synergies between numerous 552 
plant and animal species above and below the ground might not only be much more 553 
productive (Q) than conventional modern agriculture but also much more resistant and 554 
resilient to natural and economic chocks; 555 
(2) inputs anaY  can be saved which lowers environmental and production costs; 556 
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(3) price p to producers could be increased if farmers provide more diversified diets and tasty 557 
nutritious food to rural and urban households, other goods such as fuels, fibres, drugs and 558 
building materials, and are paid for ecosystem services of local and global importance (safe 559 
water, carbon and biodiversity pool, soil fertility, nutrients recycling, pollination, diseases and 560 
flood control, climate mitigation/adaptation); 561 
(4) labour intensity (La) could be high because the ecological intensification requires more 562 
dedicated human abilities than capital to detect and exploit biological synergies on 563 
heterogeneous land quality and variable weather conditions.  564 
 565 
The efficiency and economic viability of such an alternative pathway would be reinforced if 566 
land access and competition policies become more effective27. Agriculture is indeed normally 567 
subject to diseconomies of scale. The “inverse size-productivity relation” in agriculture is an 568 
old issue rose by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1964; Rudra and Sen, 1980) and the “small vs. large 569 
farms” microeconomic debate is not old dated (Wiggins et al., 2010) because many empirical 570 
data from all over the world continue to show that large farms dependent on hired managers 571 
and workers are less productive and less profitable per hectare than small farms operated 572 
primarily with family labour. Lower transaction costs of large-scale operations (information, 573 
credit, inputs, marketing…) are indeed usually offset by greater incentives of family members 574 
to work hard, by special institutional arrangements (such as cooperative or contract farming) 575 
and by the premium obtained from closer management and supervision of farm operations 576 
(Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010).  577 
 578 
                                                          
27
 A small number of farmers and related upstream and downstream agro-industries with good education and communication 
usually constitute powerful lobbies that national and international policymakers can hardly resist. These lobbies tend to 
increase the costly “protection problem” of agriculture in high-income economies (Schultz, 1953; Hayami and Godo, 2004) 
and a worldwide concentration of firms into few agro-food complexes with oligopolistic positions that limit competition and 
control both prices and technical innovations. 
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Actually no doubt that the conventional way of modernization agriculture can continue to 579 
expand especially in places where marginal productivity of external “modern inputs” (lab-580 
seeds, petrochemical fertilizers, irrigation, pesticides…) is still very high, such in sub-Saharan 581 
Africa. But in Africa like in Latin America, population will continue to rise significantly and 582 
the absorption capacity of urban areas may not be sufficient to avoid urban chaos or a 583 
bifurcation toward a Lewis Trap. It is in this sense that what we just described above might be 584 
viewed as a workable and necessary alternative utopia to agro-industrial farming. 585 
 586 
 587 
5. Conclusion 588 
 589 
This paper intends to provide material for questioning the perspective of a “world without 590 
agriculture” which is embedded in the “structural transformation” paradigm of “modern 591 
growth”. It does so by recomposing worldwide productivity trends in caloric terms from 1961 592 
to 2007 and by providing an heuristic model showing that the “Lewis Path” that leads to a 593 
“world without agriculture” is only one out of four possible pathways. 594 
 595 
The numerical analyses shows that the Lewis Path is followed by industrialized and transition 596 
countries only. Latin America and Africa follows a “Farmer-Inclusive” path with an 597 
increasing number of farmers but a narrowing gap between their incomes and those of other 598 
workers, while Asia (more than half of the world population) is embarked in a “Lewis Trap” 599 
where farmers are increasingly numerous and poorer compared to other workers and most 600 
other farmers in the world.  601 
 602 
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The shift from a Lewis Trap to a Lewis Path may not be a question of time because we also 603 
bring two other evidences:  (i) large-scale motorization (currently almost inexistent in Asia) 604 
rather than yield per hectare (very high in Asia) was up to now in the world the main driver 605 
for boosting agricultural labour productivity and the convergence of incomes across sectors, 606 
(ii) motorization cannot be large-scale in a country like India.  607 
 608 
A Lewis Path in Asia is obviously challenging and cannot be commensurate with the one 609 
faced by industrialized countries in the past. In a country like France, the Lewis’s structural 610 
transformation began long ago, was eased by labour-intensive industry and labour emigration 611 
outside Europe until World War II, and was then completed by policies encouraging a 612 
“modern agriculture” (Servolin, 1989) with no more “peasants” (Gervais et al., 1965; 613 
Mendras, 1967) but heavy-motorized “agriculturalists” until reaching a “world without 614 
agriculture” in the early 21st century (3% of the workforce and of the GDP).  615 
 616 
Such an experience cannot be replicated in Asia for at least two reasons: 617 
(i) in France, the cultivated acreage per worker could rise from 5 to 30 ha over 1961-2007 618 
(from 37 to 63 in USA, 61 to 151 in Canada) whereas in India, it decreases from 1.2 to 0.7 ha 619 
and is bounded to 10 ha in a Lewis Path scenario; 620 
(ii) today, the most dense French city is Paris with 3,400 inhabitant/km² whereas it already 621 
reaches 27,100 in Mumbai (Demographia, 2011) and should be 55,000 for all Indian cities in 622 
the Lewis Path scenario for 2050. 623 
 624 
The utopia of a few large-scale farmers and agro-industries feeding the bulk of humankind in 625 
huge megacities can hardly be that of Asia. This utopia played an historical role in some parts 626 
of the world but it is now time to envisage a more inclusive “structural transformation” based 627 
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on a mosaic of agro-ecological systems. The agro-ecological matrix seems indeed more likely 628 
to provide decent incomes and livelihoods to a multitude through  (i) a more efficient 629 
manufacture of diverse tasty nutritious food, fibres, energy, drugs, fertilizers, building 630 
materials and safe water for both rural and urban dwellers, (ii) a more efficient provision of 631 
many ecological and social services that humankind is now looking for at local and global 632 
scales.  633 
 634 
It is time to do so not only in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America to avoid unexpected 635 
bifurcations towards a Lewis Trap or growing poverty and violence in cities, as well as in 636 
industrialized countries which now experience the ecological and social limits of large-scale 637 
intensive monocultures (or breeding) in almost empty rural areas.  638 
 639 
This small-scale knowledge-intensive and context-specific agriculture embedded in 640 
manufacture and service sectors has to be largely invented. It calls for a new R&D paradigm 641 
whose “payoffs will only happen if the effort is sufficiently massive, concerted, and 642 
sustained” (Janvry, 2010). The consensus in favour of the effort of which we speak is 643 
fortunately enlarging and many try to precise its contents and expected benefits (UNEP, 644 
2011). It should involve economists wondering if we can expect a “perfect storm” in the 645 
future (Hertel, 2011) since their modelling tools should help to answer two pending big 646 
questions: (1) how our societies and their institutions get organized to promote and 647 
remunerate properly collective and public goods provided by agriculture? (2) how this new 648 
agriculture and rural organization can emerge and coexist with large-size agro-industries that 649 
now feed a growing portion of humankind? 650 
 651 
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Table 1. Typology of agricultural pathways 
 
 
TRRT /&  positive 
( θθθθ // && >aa ) 
TRRT /&  negative 
( θθθθ // && <aa ) 
aa LL /&  negative 
( aaaa YY // && >θθ ) 
(A) Lewis Path 
θθθθ /,// &&& aaaa YY>  
(B) Farmer-Excluding growth 
aaaa YY /// &&& >> θθθθ  
aa LL /&  positive 
( aaaa YY // && <θθ ) 
(C) Farmer-Inclusive growth 
θθθθ /// &&& >> aaaa YY  
(D) Lewis Trap 
θθθθ /,// &&& aaaa YY<  
 
 
Table 2. OTAWA/TALA regional values (2007) 
 
 Land Population Production Outcome Technology Affluence Workforce Labour 
 Mha Mcap. Gkcal.day-1 kcal.cap-1.day-1 kcal.ha-1.day-1 ha.worker-1 worker.cap -1 kcal.worker-1.day-1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
   [1]*[5], [2]*[7]*[8] [3]/[2], [5]x[6]x[7]    [5]x[6] 
aOECD 270 367 6,213 16,920 22,977 70,4 0,01 1,617,434 
eOECD 89 578 2,818 4,874 31,586 9,2 0,02 291,241 
TRAN 245 403 2,928 7,271 11,966 9,9 0,06 118,696 
LAC 170 561 4,355 7,758 25,611 4,0 0,08 103,051 
MENA 83 399 1,240 3,111 14,859 2,5 0,08 36,702 
SSA 217 789 2,226 2,822 10,257 1,2 0,24 11,882 
sASIA 204 1,544 4,399 2,849 21,562 0,6 0,22 13,198 
eASIA 226 1,927 9,094 4,721 40,197 0,4 0,33 14,204 
World 1,505 6,567 33,273 5,066 22,107 1.2 0.19 26,094 
 
 
Table 3. OTAWA/TALA average regional annual growth rates (1961-2007) 
 
 Land Population Production Outcome Technology Affluence Workforce Labour 
 Mha Mcap. Gkcal.day-1 kcal.cap-1.day-1 kcal.ha-1.day-1 ha.worker-1 worker.cap -1 kcal.worker-1.day-1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
   [1]+[5], [2]+[7]+[8] [3]-[2], [5]+[6]+[7]    [5]+[6] 
aOECD 0.02% 1.11% 2.98% 1.85% 2.96% 1.18% -2.22% 4.16% 
eOECD -0.42% 0.56% 1.38% 0.81% 1.79% 3.06% -3.92% 4.92% 
TRAN -0.37% 0.51% 1.21% 0.69% 1.59% 1.72% -2.54% 3.31% 
LAC 1.11% 2.05% 3.49% 1.42% 2.36% 0.67% -1.58% 3.04% 
MENA 0.29% 2.50% 3.04% 0.52% 2.74% -0.33% -1.82% 2.40% 
SSA 0.93% 2.72% 2.63% -0.08% 1.69% -1.06% -0.68% 0.61% 
sASIA 0.15% 2.14% 2.72% 0.56% 2.56% -1.33% -0.63% 1.20% 
eASIA 0.56% 1.68% 3.34% 1.64% 2.79% -0.82% -0.29% 1.93% 
World 0.23% 1.69% 2.36% 0.66% 2.12% -0.88% -0.55% 1.22% 
 
 
Table 4. The structural transformation pathways (1970-2007) 
 
 Population 
(heads) 
Workforce 
(workers) 
Economic growth 
(USD1990) 
Labour productivity 
(USD1990/worker) 
Timer gap/ratio Pathway 
 Total Total Agriculture Total Agriculture Total Agriculture TG (Eq.3) TR (Eq.4) (Table 1) 
aOECD 1.08% 1.62% -0.89% 2.91% 2.76% 1.27% 3.69% -7.85% 2.40% Lewis Path 
eOECD 0.47% 0.82% -3.42% 2.74% 0.79% 1.90% 4.36% -6.32% 2.42% Lewis Path 
TRAN 0.38% 0.38% -1.96% 1.91% 1.07% 1.50% 3.07% 4.44% 1.67% Lewis Path 
LAC 1.89% 2.92% 0.30% 3.50% 3.03% 0.56% 2.73% -4.01% 2.21% FI growth 
MENA 2.44% 3.00% 0.67% 4.10% 3.07% 1.08% 2.40% -2.79% 1.36% FI growth 
SSA 2.75% 2.80% 2.05% 3.28% 3.09% 0.46% 1.01% -0.98% 0.55% FI growth 
sASIA 2.13% 2.28% 1.49% 5.17% 2.76% 2.82% 1.25% 0.58% -1.56% Lewis Trap 
eASIA 1.49% 2.07% 1.35% 7.61% 4.38% 5.44% 3.00% 0.47% -2.31% Lewis Trap 
World 1.61% 1.95% 1.18% 3.10% 2.25% 1.13% 1.06% -0.74% -0.07% Lewis Trap 
 
Note: percentages are average regional annual growth rates between 1970 and 2007 
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Table 5. Scenarios of Lewis Trap and Path for India (2007-2050) 
 
   1980-2007 2007-2050 2007-2050 2007-2050 
   Observed Baseline Lewis Trap Lewis Path 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Population Total Mcap 1,165 1,615 1,615 1,615 
  annual growth 1.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
  Workforce % population 40% 45% 45% 45% 
Area Cropped Kha 170,000 170,000 170,000 170,000 
  Cities Kha 2,428 2,428 2,428 2,428 
Growth Total annual growth 6.1% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 
(VA) - Agriculture annual growth 3.0% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 
 - Other annual growth 7.2% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 
  Total USD1990/cap.day 2.04 30.51 30.51 30.51 
Labour Total annual growth 3.9% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 
productivity - Agriculture annual growth 1.6% 3.0% 2.3% 9.3% 
(VA/worker) - Other annual growth 3.7% 5.4% 5.8% 4.6% 
Workforce Total annual growth 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
 - Agriculture annual growth 1.4% -0.4% 0.3% -6.2% 
 - Other annual growth 3.4% 2.2% 1.8% 3.0% 
 Total Mcap 463 735 735 735 
 - Agriculture Mcap 259 217 295 17 
  - Other Mcap 204 517 440 718 
Overview Agriculture % workforce 56% 30% 40% 2% 
  % GDP (VA) 16% 2% 2% 2% 
  Timer Ratio 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.0 
  ha/farmer 0.66 0.78 0.58 10.11 
 Cities Mcap 340 947 795 1,337 
  % population 29% 59% 49% 83% 
  Kcap/km² 14 39 33 55 
       
Notes: Values other than annual growth rates are those of the final year. Figures in italics are assumptions:  
(a) population: polynomial function of the year derived from the 2000-2050 annual projections of FAO (2010) 
(r2=0.999); 
(b) workforce: polynomial function of the population derived from the 1961-2020 annual data of FAO (2010) 
(r2=0.999);  
(c) cropped area: fixed value of 170 Mha after 2000 (169.3 observed in 2007);  
(d) urban area (cities): fixed value of 2,428 Kha after 2000, obtained by dividing the Indian urban population in 
2007 (FAO, 2010) by an average density of 14,000 inhabitants per km2 (13,767 circa 2006 for all Indian urban 
areas according to Demographia (2011), and 14,083 for urban areas over 500,000 inhabitants);  
(e) urban population: urban population of 2007 + new population after 2007 – new agricultural population after 
2007; 
(f) agricultural population: agricultural workforce * β where β = ((population / workforce) – 0.25) as observed 
circa 2000; 
(g) sectoral annual growth rates (agricultural and non-agricultural added values): scenario assumptions from 
which is derived the total annual growth rate 
(h) labour productivity growth rate (agriculture or non-agriculture): scenario assumption from which is derived 
the other sector growth rate (non-agriculture or agriculture) in order to achieve the sectoral annual growth 
rates. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. International comparison of agricultural land and labour productivities 
(a) A traditional representation 
Source: Craig el al. (1997: 1066) 
(b) Our representation framework 
of food productivity pathways 
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Figure 2. Map of the countries and regions used in this study 
Cartographic source : Articque 
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Figure 3. World food productivity pathways (1961-2007) 
 
(a) All countries into six regions 
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(b) All countries into eight regions 
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(c) All countries 
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Figure 4. Production of plant food (1961-2007) 
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Figure 5. Land productivity (1961-2007) 
 
(a) Cultivated areas 
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(b) Plant food production per cultivated hectare 
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Figure 6. Labour productivity (1961-2007) 
 
(a) Active Agricultural Workers 
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(d) Agricultural workers in active population 
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Figure 7. The structural transformation (1970-2007) 
 
(a) Timmer and Akkus’s representation (b) Another representation 
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Figures show all countries from 1970 to 2007 (5020 points without Kuwait and Iceland) and their respective: 
 share of agriculture in total value-added (light green points) 
 share of agriculture in total employment (dark green points) 
 agricultural value-added share minus agricultural employment share (black points): “Timer gap” 
according to (a) average value-added per capita (GDPpc in 1990 US$ per day, values between [0.1-100.0])  
or (b) average cultivated land per agricultural worker (LANDpw in hectare, values between [0.1-100.0]) 
 
(c) Regional pathways (all countries into eight regions) 
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